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‘Britzerland’:	the	problem	of	dispute	resolution	post-
Brexit
Both	the	UK	and	Switzerland	are	trying	to	negotiate	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism	that	would
give	the	European	Court	of	Justice	the	final	word	on	the	interpretation	of	EU	law.	Carl
Baudenbacher	(Monckton	Chambers	and	former	president	of	the	EFTA	Court)	looks	at	the
inspiration	for	this	arrangement	–	the	EU-Ukraine	Agreement	–	and	explains	why	it	is	a	totally
unsuitable	framework	for	both	the	UK	and	Switzerland.	He	argues	that	the	EFTA	Court	would	be	a
far	better	place	to	resolve	disputes.
The	arbitration	mechanism	of	the	White	Paper	and	the	draft	framework
agreement
The	UK	and	Switzerland	have	so	far	tried	to	regulate	their	future	relationship	to	the	EU	completely	independently	of
each	other.	So	it	is	all	the	more	noteworthy	that	the	draft	for	a	so-called	‘framework	agreement’	between	Switzerland
and	the	EU,	and	the	UK	proposal	for	a	post	Brexit	EU-UK	Association	Agreement	as	set	out	in	the	Chequers	plan
and	the	White	Paper,	provide	for	essentially	the	same	dispute	resolution	mechanism.
According	to	the	White	Paper,	both	contracting	parties	should	have	the	option	of	referring	a	conflict	to	an
“independent	arbitration	panel”.	Where	the	UK	and	the	EU	agreed	to	retain	a	common	rulebook,	the	UK	would
recognise	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	(“ECJ”)	to	be	supreme	on	the	interpretation	of	EU	law.	In	these
instances,	there	should	thus	be	the	option	to	refer	questions	to	the	ECJ.	The	Swiss	government	has	agreed	to	the
same	type	of	conflict	management.	And	as	with	the	UK,	the	Swiss	government	claims	that	an	arbitral	tribunal	would
be	free	to	decide	whether	to	make	a	reference	to	the	ECJ.	It	also	wants	people	to	believe	that	large	parts	of	the
cases	would	concern	Swiss	law.
The	arbitration	mechanism	of	the	EU-Ukraine	agreement
An	arbitration	mechanism	is	also	contained	in	the	Association	Agreement	between	the	EU	and	Ukraine.	According	to
Articles	306	et	seqq.	of	that	treaty,	a	dispute	between	the	contracting	parties	may	be	referred	to	a	three-member
arbitration	panel	by	either	side.	However,	under	Article	322	the	arbitration	panel	is	obliged	to	request	a	binding	ruling
from	the	ECJ	where	a	dispute	raises	a	question	of	interpretation	of	a	provision	of	EU	law	referred	to	in	paragraph	1	or
of	a	provision	“which	otherwise	imposes	upon	a	Party	an	obligation	defined	by	reference	to	a	provision	of	EU	law”.
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Paragraph	1	mentions	disputes	concerning	the	interpretation	and	application	of	a	provision	relating	to	regulatory
approximation,	i.e.	technical	barriers	to	trade,	sanitary	and	phytosanitary	measures,	customs	and	trade	facilitation,
establishment,	trade	in	services,	and	electronic	commerce,	public	procurement	or	competition.	I	understand	the
expression	“which	otherwise	imposes	upon	a	Party	an	obligation	defined	by	reference	to	a	provision	of	EU	law”	as
meaning	identical	in	substance	to	EU	law.	This	means	that	essentially	all	significant	questions	must	be	referred	to	the
ECJ.
Would	the	UK	and	Switzerland	get	a	better	deal	than	Ukraine?
It	is	obvious	that	the	arbitration	models	of	the	Chequers	plan	and	of	the	Swiss-EU	framework	agreement	were
inspired	by	the	Ukraine	Agreement.	It	is,	however,	unlikely	that	the	EU	will	agree	to	an	arbitration	model	that	is	more
favourable	to	the	UK	or	to	Switzerland	than	the	Ukraine	model	is	to	Ukraine.
Arbitration	models	in	agreements	between	the	UK	and	the	EU	and	between	Switzerland	and	the	EU	would	in	all
probability	be	submitted	to	the	ECJ	for	approval.	In	this	context,	we	should	not	overlook	the	fact	that	the	Commission,
as	the	EU’s	negotiator,	has	repeatedly	agreed	to	a	dispute	resolution	mechanism	that	was	ultimately	rejected	by	the
ECJ	(see	in	particular	Opinion	1/91	on	the	First	Draft	of	the	EEA	Agreement;	Opinion	1/09	on	a	European	and	EU
Patents	Court;	Opinion	2/13	on	Access	of	the	EU	to	the	European	Convention	on	Human	Rights).
In	all	important	cases,	the	ECJ	–	ie	the	court	of	the	other	side	–	would	therefore	take	the	binding	decision.	Neither	a
British	nor	a	Swiss	judge	would	sit	on	the	ECJ.
Amateurish	bricolage:	the	Ukraine	model	doesn’t	fit
The	EU-Ukraine	treaty	was	concluded	in	a	specific	historical	and	political	context.	When	it	entered	into	force,	EU
Commission	President	Jean-Claude	Juncker	said,	inter	alia:
“With	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Association	Agreement	with	Ukraine,	the	European	Union	is	delivering	on
its	promise	to	our	Ukrainian	friends.	I	thank	all	those	who	made	it	possible:	those	who	stood	on	Maidan
and	those	who	are	working	hard	to	reform	the	country	for	the	better.”
As	a	withdrawing	EU	state	and	the	world’s	fifth	largest	economy,	the	UK	is	in	a	completely	different	situation	–	not	to
mention	the	significance	of	the	common	law	and	the	UK’s	position	in	defence	and	security.	The	Swiss	economy	is
also	highly	developed	and	the	degree	of	economic	integration	with	the	EU	is	immense.
The	attempt	to	break	elements	out	of	the	Ukraine	agreement	and	transplant	them	into	agreements	concluded	by	the
EU	and	the	UK	or	Switzerland	is	amateurish	bricolage	that	runs	counter	to	all	the	rules	of	comparative	law.	It	was
French	social	anthropologist	Claude	Lévi-Strauss	who	called	those	who	construct	something	new	from	any	material
they	find	“bricoleurs”.
A	solution	based	on	the	model	of	the	Ukraine	Agreement	would	have	a	substantially	detrimental	impact	on	legal
certainty.	The	arbitration	procedure	itself	would	take	time	and	would	be	in	addition	to	the	processing	time	of	cases
before	the	ECJ.
British	people	and	businesses	have	enjoyed	access	to	a	European	Court	for	the	last	45	years.	The	Ukraine	approach
would	cut	that	off.	Whether	a	dispute	would	go	to	arbitration	would	be	a	matter	for	HM	Government	to	decide.	Swiss
citizens	and	economic	operators	never	had	access	to	a	European	Court.	Dependency	on	the	grace	of	the
government	has	passed	into	their	flesh	and	blood.	The	situation	is	at	odds	with	what	we	understand	a	direct
democracy	to	be.
The	court	model	of	the	EEA	Agreement
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The	EEA	Agreement	gives	the	associated	states	the	right	to	have	their	own	independent	supervisory	body	and	their
own	independent	court.	It	is	based	on	a	two	pillar	system,	with	the	ECJ	as	one	pillar	and	the	EFTA	Court	the	other.
Surveillance	of	the	EU	pillar	is	in	the	hands	of	the	European	Commission,	while	in	the	EFTA	pillar	this	task	lies	with
the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority.
Experience	shows	that	under	such	a	system	the	most	important	cases	concerning	non-EU	states	are	decided	by	the
EFTA	Court.	The	EFTA	Court	has	in	the	past	upheld	values	that	are	important	for	‘Britzerland’,	such	as	free	trade,
competition,	and	fair	taxation.	With	a	Swiss	and	one	or	two	British	judges,	this	orientation	could	become	even
stronger.
The	EEA/EFTA	states	of	Iceland,	Liechtenstein,	and	Norway	have	retained	their	sovereignty	in	the	fields	of	foreign
policy	and	foreign	trade,	agriculture,	fisheries,	taxation,	and	currency.
Conflicts	between	the	ECJ	and	the	EFTA	Court	are	in	practice	resolved	by	judicial	dialogue	between	the	two	courts,
no	matter	what	the	written	provisions	foresee.	The	first	24	years	of	the	EFTA	Court’s	existence	show	that	both	courts
may	yield	their	position.	This	dialogue	is	similar	to	that	conducted	by	common	law	courts	around	the	world.	The
relevant	figures	make	it	clear	that	the	EFTA	Court	has	a	disproportionate	influence	on	the	ECJ.
The	EU	has	never	ruled	out	British	or	Swiss	EEA	membership	in	the	EFTA	pillar.	Nor	has	it	excluded	a	“docking”	or
“third	pillar”	solution	which	would	give	Britain	and	Switzerland	the	right	to	conclude	tailor-made	agreements	with	the
EU	that	institutionally	would	be	subject	to	the	EEA	two	pillar	system.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Professor	Dr.	Dr.	h.c.	Carl	Baudenbacher	is	former	President	of	the	EFTA	Court	and	now	a	tenant	at	Monckton
Chambers,	London.
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